Nadia Urbinati (2029) Me the people. How Populism Transforms Democracy. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. by Scanni, Francesco Maria
 PACO, ISSN: 2035-6609 - Copyright © 2020 - University of Salento, SIBA: http://siba-ese.unisalento.it 
 
 
 
PArtecipazione e COnflitto 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco 
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)    
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version) 
PACO, Issue 13(2) 2020: 1226-1231 
       DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v13i2p1226 
 
Published in July 15, 2020 
 
 
 
 
BOOK REVIEW 
 
Nadia Urbinati, Me the people. How Populism Transforms 
Democracy. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2019. 
  
Francesco Maria Scanni 
University of Calabria 
 
In Nadia Urbinati’s most recent book, the author explores the relationship between populism and democracy 
and the potential outcomes that populism can produce on institutions when it governs. The hypotheses that 
have been proposed relate to the particular type of relationship that populism in power establishes with 
democratic procedures, with other parties, and the way in which it transforms representation, public discourse, 
and institutions (in the most extreme cases, even Constitutions). Radical majoritarianism, difficulty in 
tolerating the division of powers, independence of judiciary power, and the statute of fundamental rights are 
downgraded by obstacles of a liberal nature which prevent the unfolding of the pure will of the people-as-one, 
summarized by a leader who embodies it.  
It is precisely from these elements, namely from the relationship that populism establishes with the 
democratic system, that the author proposes to redefine populism on the basis of a maximum conception, which 
is able to grasp the essence of populism by analyzing it as a specific form of political representation and a 
(disfigured, cf. Urbinati 2014) democratic government. This is a tried and true reversal in perspective: the 
transition from the approaches of analysis based on the dilemma: “What is populism?” – from which the 
definitions of the populist phenomenon, such as thin ideology, discursive style, and widespread mentality arose 
(cf. Freeden, 1996; Taguieff, 1995; Tarchi, 2004) – to those that focus on the analysis of what populism 
accomplishes.  
In this sense, populism is interpreted as the outcome of the transformation of three pillars – people, 
representation, and the majority principle – on which modern democracy is based (cf. Canovan, 1999). The 
comparison between the characteristic elements of populism and those of constitutional democracy fulfills the 
function of emphasizing and, in some way, weighing the tension between the two poles. The definition of 
constitutional democracy offered by the author tends to describe it as a political regime that guarantees "(...) 
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the protection of fundamental civil and political rights by limiting the power of the majority that governs" 
through pluralism, the separation of powers, and the independence of the judicial system (Urbinati, 2019 pg. 
16). The new form of representative government that populists inaugurate when they enter in government is 
characterized, however, by three factors: a) the direct relationship between the leader and the part that the 
people consider just, defined by exclusion; b) the supreme authority of the audience, of the opinion, and of the 
public; c) the impatience shown towards democratic opponents and impedimenta.  
The adjective (representative) is not accidental: a populist democracy, according to the interpretation 
proposed in this book, is described as an extreme limit to democracy (cf. Arditi, 2004), not only as a different 
interpretation of it that differs from liberal ideals. In fact, the author argues – in disagreement with the theorists 
of democratic dualism (Dahl, 1989; Przeworski, 1999) – that democracy cannot be reduced to the recurrence 
of electoral practices. Liberal components, such as the limitation of power, the existence of checks and 
balances, free information, the guarantee of civil liberties, and the presence of other parties considered 
legitimate, are inseparable from both form and democratic substance (Bobbio, 1984, Sartori, 1987). The 
interpretation of populism as a new type of representative government starts from the diarchic conception of 
democracy (cf. Tuck, 2016), which is based on the idea of democracy as a mixed decision-making government 
(i.e. political will and the procedures from which the decision-making process originates) and opinion (the 
sphere of extra-institutional political judgment). 
Modern democracy is based on the tension between these two poles, on the irreducible and necessary 
deviation between the immediate will of the various popular sectors and the political  – mediated  – translation 
of requests from below. This void, in a constitutional democracy, can be partially bridged thanks to two 
mechanisms: 1. The fictio juris of the majority as unanimity (cf. Ruffini, 1974; Rosanvallon, 2011), which 
presents itself as guarantor of everyone’s interest, also in light of the opposition’s acceptance of the result; 2. 
The constant work of representation and mediation carried out by the parties – which reduce the distance 
between the institutions and the portions of the people they represent – both in and out. This allows a 
representative democracy to keep the political process open (Kelsen, 1929, tr. 1995). A representative 
democracy, unlike a direct democracy, that does not let the moment of will and the moment of judgment 
collapse in the act itself of voting (or of a decision made through deliberation resulting from direct 
consultation). Populism, for its part, proposes a new mixed regime characterized by the oxymoric formula of 
direct representation. 
Differently from what is affirmed by those who see populism as counterposed to a representative democracy 
and closer to direct forms of democracy (cf. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), the author sustains that this 
does not emerge from representative democracy but transmits its essence, verticalizing it, that is, by using the 
incarnation of the part of the people deemed “worthy” by the leader, with representation through the parties. 
The direct component of populism, hence, does not so much refer to the ways of creating the decision but to 
the disintermediated relationship between the leader and his people. It, therefore, replaces the whole with one 
of its parts and, in this step, it redefines the essence of the representative system, no longer through the 
synecdoche – based on a pretense that is useful for keeping the democratic scheme open  –  pars pro toto, 
which replaces a pars pro pars one (cf. Müller, 2017). This is where the constitutional democracy is forced to 
its extreme limit. In fact, populism does not forgo elections (like fascism) but uses them to celebrate the 
majority and its leader, who is recognized as having a greater validity than that of other parties (cf. Finchelstein 
and Urbinati, 2018), discredited for the sole purpose of disfiguring the moral and political integrity of the 
people-as-one. Likewise, populism appropriates the majority principle for itself, in order to concentrate its own 
power. This is where majoritarianism derives (cf. Mair, 2002; Pappas, 2019).  
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This reductio ad unum of the authentic people promotes the affirmation of a majority – as expressed by the 
leader – that describes it as the only righteous one and, in doing so, tends to dissolve the mediation of the 
institutions and to exclude the other party (the dissent). The transformation that populism produces in and of 
democracy therefore, above all, concerns the holism that is inherent in its political content (Canovan, cit.). The 
modern populist phenomenon is to be found in what Bernard Manin (2010 pp. 215-261) called the latest 
transformation of representative government: public democracy. In this, traditional political organizations that 
structured collective identities leave room for an indistinct audience that expresses itself mainly through new 
mass communication channels. The attempt of populism, in such a context, is that of attracting the multiple 
requests that come from this audience of voters-users. The legitimacy of the decision stems, not so much from 
the ability to mediate and compromise within the institutions, but from the effects and reactions that political 
seduction manages to have on the recipients of the messages. The central core of populism is undoubtedly the 
antiestablishment approach (cf. Stanley, 2008; Kazin, 1998). In turn, when populists reach the government, 
they do everything to avoid looking like an establishment and launch a permanent election campaign in which 
they present themselves as “besieged rulers” by a recalcitrant elite.  
Moreover, this difficulty demonstrates the gap that is characteristic of populism between the redemptive 
side and the pragmatic one (Canovan, cit.): the representative democratic government, in producing new 
government majorities, induces parties to subject redemptive intentions to practical tests, which need practical 
fulfillment. But the success of this venture subjects the parties to an institutionalization, which populists try to 
avoid at all costs, in order not to repeat the practices of the old establishment. If the democracy of the parties 
divides popular will into conflicting interests, which it proposes to overcome through parliamentary synthesis 
and compromise, in a populist democracy, the will of the people is described as pure and predetermined (Cf. 
Mény and Surel, 2002), and acceptance of the compromise is described as a collapse towards the impure 
practice of parliamentarism that defiles the proactive purism of the people. The transformation of the meaning 
of the elections stems from the binary and irremediable opposition between the pure people and the corrupt 
elite. The elections, as presented by the populists, therefore lose their formalistic character and reveal a truth 
that already exists. The power of the people and the practice of government come together in the figure of the 
leader who claims to speak on behalf of his people (Pitkin, 1967).  
Likewise, the use of direct tools of consultation, such as referendums or popular legislative initiatives (cf. 
Martinico, 2020), responds more to the needs of the common people – such as the ratification by popular 
acclaim of decisions taken by top management – rather than to the real intentions of directly involving voters. 
During this process, the self-limitation required in democracy is lacking. In fact, the populists obtain legitimacy 
for their actions from considering themselves the authentic representatives of the people, once and for all. 
These elements already offer us a more concrete perspective on the real identifying nucleus of populism, which 
conceives politics not as the stage on which universalistic visions collide, but as a terrain of contrast between 
particular and conflicting interests of a various nature, and its purpose is the achievement of power (cf. Laclau, 
2005). In this way, politics are also purified from ethical issues and relativized as a field of contention for the 
achievement of power. The author deals with this topic in the first chapter.  
Besides the relationship it establishes with other democratic players, another peculiarity of populism in 
power is the transformative effect it produces on two concepts: that of majority and that of the people. It uses 
the majority rule as a force legitimized by being the expression of the righteous people, which allows and 
justifies the procedure of humiliating the opposition. Identifying all the people with a part of the community, 
and the consequent delegitimization to the detriment of the excluded part, makes populism a factious 
government. It is in this sense that the author speaks of a passage from particracy to the power of only one 
party – the only one deemed legitimate –  over the others. From a phobia for the party and for the society 
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divided into parts we, therefore, reach an idolatry for the righteous party. This topic is further analyzed in the 
second chapter, where the author distinguishes between People as an abstract entity of republican extraction 
and the people as part of the whole for which a decision-making legitimacy is acknowledged (Morgan, 1988 
pp. 90-91). Populists respond to the indeterminacy of the people by proposing the extraction of authentic 
people from empirical people.  
This is where the difference lies between “governing as”, wich is typical of a representative democracy (the 
pretense mentioned earlier), and “governing in the name of” (and also “instead of”). In the second case, the 
separation between popular sovereignty and the authentic people, and the separation between sovereignty and 
government as an exercise of power – that forms the basis of representative democracy – is lost. Populist 
majoritarianism starts from the idea that its own is not only a numerical majority but an ethical one, calling 
into question the temporality and, in the most extreme cases, also the transience, of its own power. The majority 
is reified and made to coincide with the empirical social majority. In the third chapter, the author focuses on 
the proprietary conception of the people that populism in power introduces, replacing the procedural vision of 
representative democracy with the idea of the majority as a force. Unlike a representative democracy, in which 
parties measure their integrating ability through the classic tools of responsiveness and accountability, 
populism promotes an identification between leader and the people that defers judgment and provides for a 
fideistic approach (cf. McCormick, 2017). While distancing the public allows to recognize the right of citizens 
to control the work of those who govern, identifying between popular will and political decisions promoted by 
populism produces the paradoxical effect of making it superfluous.  
The coincidence between institutions and an electoral body puts a strain on the permanent tension between 
legitimacy and trust. While in democracy, criticizing the elite is part of the dialectic between majority and 
opposition, in populism, it is resolved in the static juxtaposition between two poles that are stably contrary on 
the basis of the position they occupy with respect to state power. Therefore, the people and power, both 
fragmented in a representative democracy, are reassembled into a populist democracy. In fact, identifying 
representation with incorporation jeopardizes pluralism and, consequently, weakens traditional controls 
ensured by party representation. In doing so, the leader tries to neutralize, ex ante, any request for 
responsibility.  This issue is explored in the fourth chapter. The leader submits to his will, which prompts the 
people to legitimize institutional controls, impediments, and inertia. In this sense, it is possible to speak of 
populism in terms of a constituent (or re-constituent) power (Arato, 2019), which aims to build a strong and 
centralized authority and a vast social cohesion. In this identification process, plans and intentions give way to 
emotional politics, for the ideation of which the hypertrophic figure of the leader finds a very powerful means 
in the network that allows for the simplification of a trusting relationship and the rapid reception of a message 
(Gerbaudo, 2019). This means that populism is not limited to just the use of democratic institutions and 
principles, but it tends to disfigure them. Nevertheless, although institutional change may have the effect of 
weakening legislative power and controlling institutions, it does not change the political regime. Democracy 
is identified by populism through processes of unification of the masses and no longer through a dialectic 
between a majority and an opposition in a political dimension marked by party groups and partisan affiliations.  
This book is crucial for the interpretation of populism as a phenomenon that does not reduce its role to 
protesting but proposes itself as the power of government. Its purpose is to shed light on the effects that 
populism has on democracy both at an institutional, as well as at a governmental level. In particular, unlike 
traditional approaches based on a “minimal definition” of populism, Nadia Urbinati tries to develop a 
theoretical approach capable of describing populism as a new and specific form of representative government. 
In this perspective, the many ideas that have been proposed in the text represent the basis for an innovative 
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analysis which contemplates the potential repercussions on a constitutional democracy and on liberal 
institutions of populism in power. The category of populism that is examined, not as a chapter of direct 
democracy but as a form of direct representation, is the background to all the work carried out and helps us 
further analyze the main relationship that populism in government intends to strengthen: that between the 
leader and the people. Starting from a basic dualism between the people and the elite, populism tends to limit 
partisan divisions and transcends ideologies (cf. Anderson, 2017) in the name of the unity of the parts favored 
by exercising state power. An intolerance towards pluralism pushes it towards unifying the “good” electorate 
as opposed to the corrupt elite.  
These elements lead towards governing not as a majority among the many, but as the “righteous” majority, 
and elections change their meaning: they lose their formalism to become a plebiscitary mechanism that 
sanctions the existence of “a truth that already exists”. An intolerance towards procedures is the result of the 
conception of politics that rejects claims of universalism, in order to celebrate a fusion between the leader and 
the authentic people, whose voice is considered the only source of decision-making legitimacy. In fact, 
empirical observation seems to confirm that, by gaining power, populism can introduce several models of 
radical majoritarianism, and it shows an intolerance with regard to the division of powers and liberal-
democratic institutions. 
In line with Lefort’s thought (1999), power must remain empty in democracy, and no one must claim to fill 
it definitively, since a diarchy implies tension, not harmony, and the function of a vote is to regulate 
dissensions, not to solve them once and for all. In the direct representation of populism, however, a relationship 
without mediation between the people and the leader tends to occupy this space by abolishing the tension 
between the representative and the represented and the distance between in and out. It does not call into 
question the indirect relationship between the governors and the governed but, more specifically, the method 
of management used. It calls for surveillance rather than a direct government. The criticism of representation 
as a mandate is aimed at building a new form of popular representation that can overcome party divisions 
through the unifying narrative of leadership. In line with what the author emphasized, populism exploits the 
internal contradictions of democracy but does not create them. Understanding the objectives, the opportunities 
of affirmation, and the purposes of populism can then represent an opportunity towards revitalizing democracy 
and politics as a whole, understanding its limits and trying to refine the tools required to overcome them. 
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